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Moral agency is manifested in both thepower to refrainfrom behaving inhumanely
and theproactivepower to behave humanely. Moral agency is embedded in a broader
sociocognitive self theory encompassing self-organizing, proactive, self-reflective,
andself-regulatory mechanisms rooted inpersonal standards linked to self-sanctions.
The self-regulatory mechanisms governing moral conduct do not come into play un-
less they are activated, and there are manypsychosocial maneuvers by which moral
self-sanctions are selectively disengagedfrom inhumane conduct. The moral disen-
gagement may center on the cognitive restructuring ofinhumane conduct into a be-
nign or worthy one by moral justification, sanitizing language, and advantageous
comparison; disavowal ofa sense ofpersonal agency by diffusion or displacement of
responsibility; disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects ofone 's actions; and
attribution ofblame to, and dehumanization of those who are victimized. Many inhu-
manities operate through a supportive network oflegitimate enterprises run by other-
wise consideratepeople who contribute to destructive activities by disconnected sub-
division offunctions and diffusion ofresponsibility. Given the many mechanismsfor
disengaging moral control, civilized life requires, in addition to humane personal
standards, safeguards built into social systems that uphold compassionate behavior
and renounce cruelty.
The disengagement of moral self-sanctions from
inhumane conduct is a growing human problem at
both individual and collective levels. In a recent book
entitled Everybody Does It, Gabor (1994) docu-
mented the pervasiveness of moral disengagement in
all walks of life. Psychological theories of morality
focus heavily on moral thought to the neglect of
moral conduct. People suffer from the wrongs done
to them regardless of how perpetrators might justify
their inhumane actions. The regulation of humane
conduct involves much more than moral reasoning. A
complete theory of moral agency must link moral
knowledge and reasoning to moral action. This re-
quires an agentic theory of morality rather than one
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confined mainly to cognitions about morality. An
agentic theory specifies the mechanisms by which
people come to live in accordance with moral stan-
dards. In social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986,
1991), moral reasoning is translated into actions
through self-regulatory mechanisms rooted in moral
standards and self-sanctions by which moral agency
is exercised. The moral self is thus embedded in a
broader, sociocognitive self theory encompassing
self-organizing, proactive, self-reflective, and self-
regulative mechanisms. These self-referent processes
provide the motivational as well as the cognitive reg-
ulators of moral conduct.
In early phases of development, conduct is largely
regulated by external dictates and social sanctions. In
the course of socialization, people adopt moral stan-
dards that serve as guides and as major bases for
self-sanctions regarding moral conduct. In this
self-regulatory process, people monitor their conduct
and the conditions under which it occurs, judge it in
relation to their moral standards and perceived cir-
cumstances, and regulate their actions by the conse-
quences they apply to themselves. They do things
that give them satisfaction and build their sense of
self-worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that
violate their moral standards, because such conduct
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will bring self-condemnation. The constraint of nega-
tive self-sanctions for conduct that violates one's
moral standards and the support of positive
self-sanctions for conduct faithful to personal moral
standards operate anticipatorily. In the face of situa-
tional inducements to behave in inhumane ways, peo-
ple can choose to behave otherwise by exerting
self-influence. Self-sanctions keep conduct in line
with personal standards. It is through the ongoing ex-
ercise of self-influence that moral conduct is moti-
vated and regulated. This capacity for self-influence
gives meaning to moral agency. Self-sanctions mark
the presence of moral oughts.
The exercise of moral agency has dual as-
pects-inhibitive and proactive. The inhibitive form is
manifested in the power to refrain from behaving inhu-
manely. Theproactive form ofmorality is expressed in
the power to behave humanely. In the latter case, indi-
viduals invest their sense of self-worth so strongly in
humane convictions and social obligations that they
act against what they regard as unjust or immoral even
though their actions may incur heavy personal costs.
Failure to do what is right would incur self-devaluation
costs. In this higher order morality, people do good
things as well as refrain from doing bad things. Rorty's
(1993) analysis of the moral self in terms of a so-
cial-practice morality is another example of a theory
that highlights proactive morality rooted in social obli-
gation rather than just the morality of inhibition.
Moral standards do not operate invariantly as in-
ternal regulators of conduct, however. Self-regulatory
mechanisms do not come into play unless they are ac-
tivated, and there are many social and psychological
maneuvers by which moral self-sanctions can be dis-
engaged from inhumane conduct. Selective activation
and disengagement of personal control permit differ-
ent types of conduct by persons with the same moral
standards under different circumstances. Figure 1
shows the points in the process of internal control at
which moral self-censure can be disengaged from
reprehensible conduct. The disengagement may cen-
ter on (a) the reconstrual of the conduct itself so it is
not viewed as immoral, (b) the operation of the
agency of action so that the perpetrators can mini-
mize their role in causing harm, (c) the consequences
that flow from actions, or (d) how the victims of mal-
treatment are regarded by devaluing them as human
beings and blaming them for what is being done to
them. The sections that follow document how each of
these types of moral disengagement functions in the
perpetration of inhumanities.
Moral Justification
One set of disengagement practices operates on the
cognitive reconstruction of the behavior itself. People
do not ordinarily engage in harmful conduct until they
have justified to themselves the morality of their ac-
tions. In this process ofmoral justification, detrimental
conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by
portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral pur-
poses. People then can act on a moral imperative and
preserve their view of themselves as moral agents
while inflicting harm on others. Regional variations in
the social sanctioning and use ofviolent means are pre-
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Figure 1. Mechanism through which moral self-sanctions are selectively activated and disengaged from detrimental behavior at different
points in the self-regulatory process. From Social Foundations ofThought andAction:A Social Cognitive Theory (p. 376), by A. Bandura,
1986, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Copyright 1986 by Prentice Hall. Reprinted with permission.
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dictable from moral justifications rooted in a
subcultural code of honor (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).
Rapid radical shifts in destructive behavior through
moral justification are most strikingly revealed in mili-
tary conduct (Kelman, 1973; Skeyhill, 1928). The con-
version of socialized people into dedicated fighters is
achieved not by altering their personality structures,
aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather, it is ac-
complished by cognitively redefining the morality of
killing so that it can be done free from self-censure.
Through moral justification of violent means, people
see themselves as fighting ruthless oppressors, protect-
ing their cherished values, preserving world peace,
saving humanity from subjugation, or honoring their
country's commitments. Just war tenets were devised
to specify when the use of violent force is morally jus-
tified. However, given people's dexterous facility for
justifying violent means, all kinds of inhumanities get
clothed in moral wrappings.
Voltaire put it well when he said, "Those who can
make you believe absurdities can make you commit
atrocities." Over the centuries, much destructive con-
duct has been perpetrated by ordinary, decent people in
the name of righteous ideologies, religious principles,
and nationalistic imperatives (Kramer, 1990; Rapoport
& Alexander, 1982; Reich, 1990). Widespread ethnic
wars are producing atrocities of appalling proportions.
When viewed from divergent perspectives, the same
violent acts are different things to different people. It is
often proclaimed in conflicts ofpower that one group's
terroristic activity is another group's liberation move-
ment fought by heroic fighters. This is why moral ap-
peals against violence usually fall on deaf ears.
Adversaries sanctify their own militant actions but
condemn those of their antagonists as barbarity mas-
querading as outrageous moral reasoning. Each side
feels morally superior to the other.
Euphemistic Labeling
Language shapes thought patterns on which ac-
tions are based. Activities can take on very different
appearances depending on what they are called. Not
surprisingly, euphemistic language is widely used to
make harmful conduct respectable and to reduce per-
sonal responsibility for it. Euphemizing is an injuri-
ous weapon. People behave much more cruelly when
assaultive actions are verbally sanitized than when
they are called aggression (Diener, Dineen, Endresen,
Beaman, & Fraser, 1975).
In an insightful analysis of the language of
nonresponsibility, Gambino (1973) identified the dif-
ferent varieties of euphemisms. One form relies on
sanitizing language. By camouflaging pernicious ac-
tivities in innocent or sanitizing parlance, the activi-
ties lose much of their repugnancy. Soldiers "waste"
people rather than kill them. Bombing missions are
described as "servicing the target," in the likeness of
a public utility. The attacks become "clean, surgical
strikes," arousing imagery of curative activities. The
civilians whom the bombs kill are linguistically con-
verted to "collateral damage." In an effort to sanitize
state executions, a U.S. senator proclaimed, "capital
punishment is our society's recognition of the sanc-
tity of human life." This memorable verbal sanitiza-
tion won him the uncoveted third-place award in the
national Doublespeak competition.
Sanitizing euphemisms also are used extensively in
unpleasant activities that people do from time to time.
In the language of some government agencies, people
are not fired, they are given a "career alternative en-
hancement," as though they were receiving a promo-
tion. Being "disfellowshipped" is getting one's self
fired by the Baptists. In the Watergate hearings, lies
became "a different version ofthe facts." An "involun-
tary conversion of a 727" is a plain old airplane crash.
The television industry produces and markets some of
the most brutal forms ofhuman cruelty under the sani-
tized labels of "action and adventure" programming.
The acid rain that is killing our lakes and forests is
merely "atmospheric deposition of anthropogenically
derived substances." The nuclear power industry has
created its own specialized set of euphemisms for the
injurious effects of nuclear mishaps. An explosion be-
comes an "energetic disassembly." A reactor accident
is a "normal aberration."
The agentless passive style in depicting events
serves as another linguistic tool for creating the ap-
pearance that reprehensible acts are the work ofname-
less forces rather than ofpeople (Bolinger, 1982). It is
as though people are moved mechanically but are not
really the agents of their own acts. Even inanimate ob-
jects are sometimes turned into agents. Here is a driver
explaining to police how he managed to demolish a
telephone pole: "The telephone pole was approaching.
I was attempting to swerve out ofits way when it struck
my front end."
The specialized jargon of a legitimate enterprise is
also misused to lend respectability to an illegitimate
one. In the vocabulary of the lawbreakers in Nixon's
administration, criminal conspiracy became a "game
plan," and the conspirators were "team players," like
the best of sportsmen. They eLevated the word cor-
ruption to new heights in the service of criminal
conduct.
Advantageous Comparison
Advantageous comparison is another way of mak-
ing harmful conduct look good. How behavior is
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viewed is colored by what it is compared against. By
exploiting the contrast principle, reprehensible acts
can be made righteous. Terrorists see their behavior as
acts of selfless martyrdom by comparing them with
widespread cruelties inflicted on the people with
whom they identify. The more flagrant the contrasting
inhumanities, the more likely it is that one's own de-
structive conduct will appear benevolent. For example,
the massive destruction in Vietnam was minimized by
portraying the American military intervention as sav-
ing the populace from Communist enslavement.
Expedient historical comparison also serves
self-exonerating purposes. For example, apologists for
the lawlessness of political figures they support cite
transgressions by past rival administrations as vindica-
tions. Adapters of violent means are quick to point out
that democracies, such as those of France and the
United States, were achieved through violence against
oppressive rule.
Exonerating comparison relies heavily on moral
justification by utilitarian standards. The task of mak-
ing violence morally acceptable from a utilitarian per-
spective is facilitated by two sets ofjudgments. First,
nonviolent options are judged to be ineffective to
achieve desired changes, thus removing them from
consideration. Second, utilitarian analyses using ad-
vantageous comparisons with actual or anticipated
threats by one's adversaries affirm that one's injurious
actions will prevent more human suffering than they
cause. The utilitarian cost-benefit calculus, however,
can be quite slippery in specific applications. The fu-
ture contains many uncertainties and ambiguities. Hu-
man predictive judgment is, therefore, subject to a lot
of biases (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As a result, calcula-
tions of long-term human costs and benefits are often
suspect. There is much subjectivity in estimating the
gravity of potential threats. Moreover, violence is of-
ten used as a weapon against small threats on the
grounds that they will escalate and spread to where
they will take a heavy toll on human suffering if left
unchecked. The frequently invoked "domino effect"
reflects this type of escalative projection concerning
the likely course of events. Judgment of gravity justi-
fies choice of options, but preference for violent op-
tions often biases judgment of gravity.
Assessments of conflicting realities and the best
means to deal with them can be flawed by biasing so-
cial processes as well as by inferential errors from un-
certain information. The information on which
judgments are made may be tainted by the policy bi-
ases of those gathering and interpreting it (March,
1982). The use ofsuperficial similarities in the framing
of issues can distort judgment of the justification of vi-
olent means (Gilovich, 1981). For example, in judging
how the United States should respond to a totalitarian
threat toward a small nation by another country, people
advocated a more interventionist course of action
when the international crisis was likened to another
Munich, representing political appeasement of Nazi
Germany, than when it was likened to another Viet-
nam, representing a disastrous military entanglement.
Gilovich added a new twist to Santayana's adage that
those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it:
Those who see unwarranted likeness to the past are dis-
posed to misapply its lessons.
Cognitive restructuring ofharmful conduct through
moral justifications, sanitizing language, and exonerat-
ing comparisons, taken together, is the most powerful
set of psychological mechanisms for disengaging
moral control. Investing harmful conduct with high
moral purpose not only eliminates self-censure, but it
engages self-approval in the service of destructive ex-
ploits. What was once morally condemnable becomes
a source of self-valuation. Functionaries work hard to
become proficient at them and take pride in their de-
structive accomplishments.
Displacement of Responsibility
Moral control operates most strongly when people
acknowledge that they cause harm by their detrimen-
tal actions. The second set of disengagement prac-
tices operates by obscuring or minimizing the
agentive role in the harm one causes. People will be-
have in ways they typically repudiate if a legitimate
authority accepts responsibility for the effects of their
conduct (Diener, 1977; Milgram, 1974). Under dis-
placed responsibility, they view their actions as stem-
ming from the dictates of authorities; they do not feel
personally responsible for the actions. Because they
are not the actual agent of their actions, they are
spared self-condemning reactions.
Self-exemption from gross inhumanities by dis-
placement of responsibility is most gruesomely re-
vealed in socially sanctioned mass executions. Nazi
prison commandants and their staffs divested them-
selves of personal responsibility for their unprece-
dented inhumanities (Andrus, 1969). They claimed
they were simply carrying out orders. Self-exonerating
obedience to horrific orders is similarly evident in mil-
itary atrocities, such as the My Lai massacre (Kelman
& Hamilton, 1989).
In psychological studies ofdisengagement ofmoral
control by displacement of responsibility, authorities
explicitly authorize injurious actions and hold them-
selves responsible for the harm caused by their follow-
ers. For example, Milgram (1974) got people to
escalate their level ofaggression by commanding them
to do so and telling them that he took full responsibility
for the consequences oftheir actions. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, the greater the legitimacy and closeness of the
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Figure 2. Percentage ofpeople fully obedient to injurious commands as a function ofthe legitimization and closeness ofthe authority issu-
ing the commands. This figure is plotted from data from Experiments 5,7,13,15,17, and 18 from Obedience toAuthority:An Experimental
View, by S. Milgram, 1974, New York: Harper & Row. Copyright 1974 by HarperCollins, Publishers. Adapted with permission.
authority issuing injurious commands, the higher the
level of obedient aggression.
The sanctioning of harmful conduct in everyday
life differs in two important ways from the direct au-
thorizing system examined by Milgram (1974). Re-
sponsibility is rarely assumed that openly. Only
obtuse authorities would leave themselves accusable
of authorizing harmful acts. They usually invite and
support harmful conduct in insidious ways for per-
sonal and social reasons. Through surreptitious sanc-
tioning practices, they can shield themselves from
social condemnation should the courses of action go
awry. They also have to live with themselves. Sanc-
tioning by indirection enables them to protect against
loss of self-respect for authorizing human cruelty.
In detrimental schemes, authorities act in ways
that keep themselves intentionally uninformed. As
our secretary of state instructed a presidential advisor
in the Iran-Contra affair, "Just tell me what I need to
know." Authorities do not go looking for evidence of
wrongdoing. Obvious questions that would reveal in-
criminating information remain unasked, so officials
do not find out what they do not want to know. Im-
plicit agreements, insulating social arrangements, and
authorization by indirection are used to leave the
higher echelons unblamable.
When harmful practices are publicized, they are of-
ficially dismissed as only isolated incidents arising
from misunderstandings of what had been authorized,
or the blame is assigned to subordinates, who are por-
trayed as misguided or overzealous. Investigators who
go looking for incriminating records of authorization
display naivete about the insidious ways that perni-
cious practices usually are sanctioned and carried out.
One finds decisional arrangements of foggy
nonresponsibility rather than incriminating traces of
smoking guns.
There is another basic difference from the direct au-
thorizing system. Obedient functionaries do not cast
off all responsibility for their behavior as if they were
mindless extensions of others. If they disowned all re-
sponsibility, they would perform their duties only
when told to do so. It requires a strong sense ofrespon-
sibility, rooted in ideology, to be a good functionary. It
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is, therefore, important to distinguish between two lev-
els of responsibility: duty to one's superiors and ac-
countability for the effects of one's actions. The best
functionaries are those who honor their obligations to
authorities but feel no personal responsibility for the
harm they cause. They work dutifully to be good at
their evildoing. Followers who disowned responsibil-
ity, without being bound by a sense of duty, would be
quite unreliable in performing their duties when the au-
thorities are not around.
Goldhagen (1996) documented that many of the
perpetrators in the German genocide infantry were
more than willing executioners. Disengagement prac-
tices operate within sociopolitical structures that shape
their expression and affect their prevalence. Cultural
hatreds create low thresholds for the disengagement of
moral self-sanctions. Inhumanities toward human be-
ings cast in devalued categories and invested with vile
attributes become not only permissible but righteously
approvable.
Diffusion of Responsibility
The exercise of moral control is also weakened
when personal agency is obscured by diffusing respon-
sibility for detrimental behavior. Kelman (1973) pro-
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vided a discerning analysis of the different ways in
which a sense ofpersonal agency gets obscured by dif-
fusing personal accountability. There are several ways
of doing it. A sense of responsibility can be diffused,
and thereby diminished, by division of labor. Most en-
terprises require the services ofmany people, each per-
forming subdivided jobs that seem harmless in
themselves. After activities become routinized into de-
tached subfunctions, people shift their attention from
the morality of what they are doing to the operational
details and efficiency of their specific job.
Group decision making is another common prac-
tice that gets otherwise considerate people to behave
inhumanely. When everyone is responsible, no one
really feels responsible. Social organizations go to
great lengths to devise mechanisms for obscuring re-
sponsibility for decisions that will affect others ad-
versely. Collective action is still another expedient
for weakening moral control (Zimbardo, 1995). Any
harm done by a group can always be attributed
largely to the behavior of others (Bandura, Under-
wood, & Fromson, 1975). Figure 3 shows the level of
harm inflicted on others on repeated occasions de-
pending on whether it was done as a group or indi-
vidually. People act more cruelly under group
responsibility than when they hold themselves per-
sonally accountable for their actions.
S . GROUP RESPONSIBILITY
0---o INDIVIDUAL o
I I
1 2 3 4 5 6
OCCASIONS
7 8 9 10
Figure 3. Level of punitiveness by individuals under conditions in which severity of their
punitiveness was determined personally or jointly by a group. Occasions represent succes-
sive times at which punitive sanctions could be applied. From "Disinhibition ofAggression
Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims," by A. Bandura, B.
Underwood, & M. E. Fromson, 1975, Journal ofResearch in Personality, 9, p. 260. Copy-
right 1975 by Academic Press. Reprinted with permission.
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Disregard or Distortion of
Consequences
Additional ways of weakening moral control oper-
ate by disregarding or distorting the effects ofone's ac-
tions. When people pursue activities that are harmful to
others for reasons of personal gain or social pressure,
they avoid facing the harm they cause, or they mini-
mize it. Ifminimization does not work, the evidence of
harm can be discredited. As long as the harmful results
of one's conduct are ignored, minimized, distorted, or
disbelieved, there is little reason for self-censure to be
activated.
It is easier to harm others when their suffering is
not visible and when injurious actions are physically
and temporally remote from their effects. Our death
technologies have become highly lethal and deper-
sonalized. We are now in the era of faceless warfare,
in which mass destruction is delivered remotely with
deadly accuracy by computer and laser-controlled
systems. When people can see and hear the suffering
they cause, vicariously aroused distress and
self-censure serve as self-restrainers (Bandura, 1992).
As shown in Figure 4, people are less compliant to
the injurious commands of authorities when the vic-
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tims' pain becomes more evident and personalized
(Milgram, 1974). Even a high sense of personal re-
sponsibility is a weak restrainer of injurious conduct
when aggressors do not see the harm they inflict on
their victims (Tilker, 1970).
A Pulitzer prize was awarded for a powerful
photograph that captured the anguished cries of a
girl whose clothes were burned off by the napalm
bombing of her village in Vietnam. This single hu-
manization of inflicted destruction probably did
more to turn the American public against the war
than the countless reports filed by journalists. The
military now bans cameras and journalists from bat-
tlefield areas to block disturbing images of death
and destruction.
Most organizations involve hierarchical chains of
command in which superiors formulate plans and in-
termediaries transmit them to functionaries who then
carry them out. The farther removed individuals are
from the destructive end results, the weaker is the re-
straining power of injurious effects. Disengagement
of moral control is easiest for the intermediaries in a
hierarchical system-they neither bear responsibility
for the decisions nor do they carry them out and face
the harm being inflicted (Kilham & Mann, 1974).
HEARS SEES AND HEARS DIRECT
SUFFERING SUFFERING INFLICTION
OF REMOTE OF REMOTE OF SUFFERING
INFLICTION INFLICTION
Figure 4. Percentage ofpeople fully obedient to injurious commands issued by an author-
ity as the victim's suffering becomes more evident and personalized. This figure is plotted
from data from Experiments 1 through 4 from Obedience to Authority: An Experimental
View, by S. Milgram, 1974, New York: Harper & Row. Copyright 1974 by HarperCollins
Publishers. Adapted with permission.
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Dehumanization
The final set of disengagement practices operates
on the recipients of detrimental acts. The strength of
moral self-censure depends partly on how the perpe-
trators view the people they mistreat. Correlative in-
terpersonal experiences during formative years, in
which people experience joys and suffer pain to-
gether, create the foundation for empathic respon-
siveness to the plight of others (Bandura, 1986). To
perceive another in terms of common humanity acti-
vates empathetic emotional reactions through per-
ceived similarity and a sense of social obligation
(Bandura, 1992; McHugo, Smith, & Lanzetta, 1982).
The joys and suffering of those with whom one iden-
tifies are more vicariously arousing than are those of
strangers or of individuals who have been divested of
human qualities. It is, therefore, difficult to mistreat
humanized persons without suffering personal dis-
tress and self-condemnation.
Self-censure for cruel conduct can be disengaged by
stripping people of human qualities. Once dehuman-
ized, they are no longer viewed as persons with feel-
ings, hopes, and concerns but as subhuman objects
(Keen, 1986; Kelman, 1973). They are portrayed as
mindless "savages," "gooks," and other despicable
wretches. If dispossessing one's foes of humanness
does not weaken self-censure, it can be eliminated by
attributing demonic or bestial qualities to them. They
become "satanic fiends," "degenerates," and other bes-
tial creatures. It is easier to brutalize people when they
are viewed as low animal forms, as when Greek tortur-
ers referred to their victims as "worms" (Gibson &
Haritos-Fatouros, 1986).
During wartime, nations cast their enemies in the
most dehumanized, demonic, and bestial images to
make it easier to kill them (Ivie, 1980). The process
of dehumanization is an essential ingredient in the
perpetration of inhumanities. Levi (1987) reported an
incident in which a Nazi camp commandant was
asked why the Nazis went to such extreme lengths to
degrade their victims, whom they were going to kill
anyway. The commandant chillingly explained that it
was not a matter of purposeless cruelty. Rather, the
victims had to be degraded to the level of subhuman
objects so that those who operated the gas chambers
would be less burdened by distress.
In experimental studies of the perniciousness of
the combined effect of dehumanization and a dimin-
ished sense of personal responsibility, a supervisory
team was given the power to punish a group of prob-
lem solvers with varying intensities of electric shock
for deficient performances (Bandura et al., 1975).
The punishment was administered either personally
or collectively to the performing recipients character-
ized in either humanistic, animalistic, or neutral
terms. Unknown to the supervisors, the administered
shocks were never delivered to the recipients. Dehu-
manized individuals were treated more punitively
than those who had been invested with human
qualities (Bandura et al., 1975). Figure 5 depicts the
power of dehumanization to promote human
punitiveness.
Combining diffused responsibility with dehuman-
ization greatly escalates the level of punitiveness. In
contrast, personalization of responsibility and hu-
manization of others together have a powerful
self-restraining effect (Figure 6). The supervisor's
self-regulatory evaluative reactions to performing a
punitive role differed markedly across the different
disengagement conditions. Those who assumed per-
sonal responsibility for their actions with humanized
individuals rarely expressed self-exonerative justifi-
cations and uniformly disavowed punitive sanctions.
By contrast, when performers were divested of hu-
manness and punished collectively, the supervisors
often voiced exonerative justifications for punitive
sanctions and were disinclined to condemn their use.
This is especially true when punitive sanctions were
dysfunctionally applied in increasing intensities that
impaired rather then improved group performance.
Self-exonerators behaved more harshly than do
self-disapprovers of punitive actions.
Many conditions of contemporary life are condu-
cive to impersonalization and dehumanization (Ber-
nard, Ottenberg, & Redl, 1965). Bureaucratization,
automation, urbanization, and high geographical mo-
bility lead people to relate to each other in anonymous,
impersonal ways. In addition, social practices that di-
vide people into ingroup and outgroup members pro-
duce human estrangement that fosters dehumanization.
Strangers can be more easily depersonalized than can
acquaintances.
Under certain conditions, wielding institutional
power changes the power holders in ways that are con-
ducive to dehumanization. This happens when persons
in positions of authority have coercive power over oth-
ers with few safeguards to constrain their behavior.
Power holders come to devalue those over whom they
wield control (Kipnis, 1974). Even college students,
who had been randomly assigned to serve as either in-
mates or guards, when given unilateral power in a sim-
ulated prison, quickly come to treat their charges in
degrading, tyrannical ways (Haney, Banks, &
Zimbardo, 1973).
The findings from research on the different mecha-
nisms of moral disengagement are in accord with the
historical chronicle of human atrocities: It requires
conducive social conditions rather than monstrous
people to produce atrocious deeds. Given appropriate
social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to
do extraordinarily cruel things.
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From "Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of
Victims," by A. Bandura, B. Underwood, & M. E. Fromson, 1975, Journal ofResearch in Personal-
ity, 9, p. 260. Copyright 1975 by Academic Press. Reprinted with permission.
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Power of Humanization
Psychological theorizing and research tends to em-
phasize how easy it is to bring out the worst in people
through dehumanization and other self-exonerative
means. The sensational negative findings receive the
greatest attention. For example, Milgram's (1974) re-
search on obedient aggression is widely cited as evi-
dence that good people can be talked into performing
cruel deeds. What is rarely noted is the equally strik-
ing evidence that most people refuse to behave cru-
elly, even under unrelenting authoritarian commands,
if the situation is personalized by having them inflict
pain by direct personal action rather than remotely
and if they see the suffering they cause (Bandura et
al., 1975; Milgram, 1974). Even when punitive sanc-
tions are the only means available and they are highly
functional in producing desired results, those exercis-
ing that power cannot get themselves to behave puni-
tively toward humanized individuals (see Figure 7).
In contrast, when punitive sanctions are dysfunctional
because they usually fail to produce results,
punitiveness is precipitously escalated toward dehu-
manized individuals. The failure of degraded individ-
uals to change in response to punitive treatment is
taken as further evidence of their culpability that jus-
tifies intensified punitiveness toward them.
The emphasis on obedient aggression is under-
standable considering the prevalence of people's in-
humanities to one another. However, the power of
humanization to counteract cruel conduct also has
considerable social import. People's recognition of
the social linkage of their lives and their vested inter-
est in each other's welfare help to support actions that
instill them with a sense of community. The affirma-
tion of common humanity can bring out the best in
others.
The My Lai massacre graphically illustrates the
dual aspects of moral agency. An American platoon,
led by Lieutenant William Calley, massacred 500
Vietnamese women, children, and elderly men. In-
sightful analyses have documented how moral
self-sanctions were disengaged from the brutal col-
lective conduct (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). A cere-
mony, 30 years in coming, was held at the Vietnam
Veteran's Memorial honoring extraordinary heroism
of prosocial morality (Zganjar, 1998). The moral
courage that was honored testifies to the remarkable
power of humanization. Hugh Thompson, a young
helicopter pilot, swooped down over the village of
My Lai on a search- and-destroy mission as the mas-
sacre was occurring. He spotted an injured girl,
marked the spot with a smoke signal, and radioed for
help. Much to his horror, he saw a soldier flip her
2 4 6
FUNCTIONAL
Figure 7. Level ofpunitive sanctions imposed on repeated occasions as a result ofdehumanization ofthe
recipients and the effectiveness ofthe punitive actions. Under the functional condition, punishment con-
sistently produced improved performances; under the dysfunctional condition, punishment usually
gave rise to performance failures. From "Disinhibition ofAggression Through Diffusion ofResponsibil-
ity and Dehumanization ofVictims," by A. Bandura, B. Underwood, & M. E. Fromson, 1975, Journal of
Research in Personality, 9, p. 264. Copyright 1975 by Academic Press. Reprinted with permission.
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MECHANISMS OF MORAL DISENGAGEMENT
over and spray her with a round of fire. On seeing the
human carnage in an irrigation ditch and soldiers fir-
ing into the bodies, he realized that he was in the
midst of a massacre.
He was moved to proactive moral action by the
sight of a terrified woman with a baby in her arms
and a child clinging to her leg. As he explained his
sense of common humanity, "These people were
looking at me for help and there is no way I could
turn by back on them." He told the commanding offi-
cer to help him remove the remaining villagers. The
officer replied that "The only help they'll get is a
hand grenade." Thompson moved his helicopter in
the line of fire and commanded his gunner to fire on
his approaching countrymen if they tried to harm the
villagers. He radioed the accompanying gunships for
help and together they airlifted the remaining dozen
villagers to safety. He flew back to the irrigation
ditch where they found and rescued a 2-year-old boy
still clinging to his dead mother. Thompson described
his empathetic human linkage: "I had a son at home
about the same age."
Proactive moral action is regulated in large part by
resolute engagement of the mechanisms of moral
agency. In the exercise of proactive morality, people
act in the name of humane principles when social cir-
cumstances dictate expedient, transgressive, and det-
rimental conduct. They disavow use of valued social
ends to justify destructive means. They sacrifice their
well-being for their convictions. They take personal
responsibility for the consequences of their actions.
They remain sensitive to the suffering of others.
Finally, they see human commonalities rather than
distance themselves from others or divest them of hu-
man qualities.
Social psychology often emphasizes the power of
the situation over the individual. In the case of re-
markable moral courage, the individual triumphs as a
moral agent over compelling situational pressures to
behave otherwise. Such moral heroism is most strik-
ingly documented in rescuers who risked their lives,
often over prolonged periods fraught with extreme
danger, to save from the Holocaust persecuted Jews
with whom they had no prior acquaintance and had
nothing material or social to gain by doing so (Oliner
& Oliner, 1988; Stein, 1988). Humanization can
rouse empathic sentiments and a strong sense of so-
cial obligation linked to evaluative self-sanctions that
motivate humane actions on others' behalf at a sacri-
fice of one's self-interest or even at one's own peril
(Bandura, 1986). In the case of the rescuers, a reso-
lute personal obligation for the welfare of persecuted
individuals overrode self-concern despite the grave
risks and heavy burdens the extended protective care
entailed. Rescuers viewed their behavior as a human
duty rather than as extraordinary acts of moral hero-
ism. Once the protective relationship was initiated,
the development of social bonds heightened the force
of empathic concern and moral obligation.
Attribution of Blame
Blaming one's adversaries or circumstances is still
another expedient that can serve self-exonerative pur-
poses. In this process, people view themselves as fault-
less victims driven to injurious conduct by forcible
provocation. Punitive conduct is, thus, seen as ajustifi-
able defensive reaction to belligerent provocations.
Conflictful transactions typically involve reciprocally
escalative acts. One can select from the chain of events
a defensive act by the adversary and portray it as initi-
ating provocation. Victims then get blamed for bring-
ing suffering on themselves. Self-exoneration is also
achievable by viewing one's harmful conduct as
forced by compelling circumstances rather than as a
personal decision. By fixing the blame on others or on
circumstances, not only are one's own injurious ac-
tions excusable, but one even can feel self-righteous in
the process.
Justified abuse can have more devastating human
consequences than acknowledged cruelty. Mistreat-
ment that is not clothed in righteousness makes the per-
petrator rather than the victim blameworthy. However,
when victims are convincingly blamed for their plight,
they eventually may come to believe the degrading
characterizations of themselves (Hallie, 1971). Exon-
erated inhumanity is, thus, more likely to instill
self-contempt in victims than inhumanity that does not
attempt to justify itself. Seeing victims suffer maltreat-
ment for which they are held partially responsible
leads observers to denigrate them (Lerner & Miller,
1978). The devaluation and indignation aroused by as-
cribed culpability provides further moral justification
for even greater maltreatment.
Gradualistic Moral Disengagement
Disengagement practices will not instantly trans-
form considerate persons into cruel ones. Rather, the
change is achieved by gradual disengagement of
self-censure. People may not even recognize the
changes they are undergoing. Initially, they perform
milder aggressive acts they can tolerate with some
discomfort. After their self-reproof has been dimin-
ished through repeated enactments, the level of ruth-
lessness increases, until eventually acts originally
regarded as abhorrent can be performed with little
personal anguish or self-censure. Inhumane practices
become thoughtlessly routinized.
The gradual disengagement of morality is illus-
trated by a prison guard who assisted in the execution
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of convicts by gassing. Putting people to death re-
quires subdivision of the task to get someone to do it.
The guard's role was limited to strapping the legs to
the death chair. This spared him the image of execu-
tioner: "I never pulled the trigger. I wasn't the execu-
tioner" (Marine, 1990), he explained. Executioners
require heavy use of euphemisms as well. The guard
received $35 extra for each execution. In a linguistic
rechristening of deathly gassing as benevolent caring,
he remarked "That was a lot of money for
baby-sitting." He described the changes he had un-
dergone over the course of 126 executions as follows:
"It never bothered me, when I was down at their legs
strapping them in. But after I'd get home, I'd think
about it. But then it would go away. And then, at last,
it was just another job." Haney (1997) presented a
systematic analysis of the way in which capital trials
are structured to enlist the various mechanisms of
moral disengagement. This enables jurors to sentence
a human being to death. Executions have become
routinized to the point in which there are no longer
any vigils or media coverage at the midnight execu-
tions. Societal executions are now not only out of
sight but out of mind.
Sprinzak (1986, 1990) showed that terrorists,
whether on the political left or right, evolve gradually
rather than set out to become radicals. The process of
radicalization involves a gradual disengagement of
moral sanctions from violent conduct. It begins with
prosocial efforts to change particular social policies
and opposition to officials, who are intent on keeping
things as they are. Embittering failures to accomplish
social change and hostile confrontations with authori-
ties and police lead to growing disillusionment and
alienation from the whole system. Escalating battles
culminate in terrorists' efforts to destroy the system
and its dehumanized rulers.
Moral Disengagement in the
Merchandising of Deathly Wares
So far, I have described the different mechanisms of
moral disengagement individually. In the transactions
of everyday life, they operate in concert within a
sociostructural context to promote inhumanities. This
is well illustrated in the analyses by Thomas (1982) of
the activities of an American weapons dealer named
Terpil. He supplied despots with weapons, assassina-
tion equipment, and the latest in terrorist technology.
This case is especially informative because it shows
vividly that those who trade in human destruction do
not do it alone. They depend heavily on the moral dis-
engagement of a network of reputable agents manag-
ing respectable enterprises.
Terpil became a weapons merchant after he fell
from grace at the Central Intelligence Agency. He
masked his death operations in the euphemisms of a
legitimate business fulfilling "consumer needs," un-
der the sanitized name Intercontinental Technology.
To spare himself any self-censure for contributing to
human atrocities, he actively avoided knowledge of
the purposes to which his weapons would be put. "I
don't ever want to know that," he said. When asked
whether he was ever haunted by any thoughts about
the human suffering his deathly wares might cause,
he explained that a weapons dealer cannot afford to
think about human consequences: "If I really thought
about the consequences all the time, I certainly
wouldn't have been in this business. You have to
blank it off."
Probes for any signs of self-reproach only brought
self-exonerative comparisons. When asked if he felt
any qualms about supplying torture equipment to
Ugandan president Idi Amin, Terpil replied with jus-
tification by advantageous comparison. As he put it
I'm sure that the people from Dow Chemical didn't
think of the consequences of selling napalm. If they
did, they wouldn't be working at the factory. I doubt
very much if they'd feel any more responsible for the
ultimate use than I did for my equipment.
When pressed about the atrocities committed at Amin's
torture chambers, Terpil repeated his depersonalized
view: "I do not get wrapped up emotionally with the
country. I regard myself basically as neutral, and com-
mercial." To give legitimacy to his "private practice,"
he claimed that he aided British and American covert
operations abroad as well.
What began as a psychological analysis of the op-
erator of a death industry ended unexpectedly in an
international network of supporting legitimate enter-
prises run by upstanding, conscientious people. The
merchandising of terrorism is not accomplished by a
few unsavory individuals. It requires a worldwide
network of reputable, high-level members of society
who contribute to the deathly enterprise by insulating
fractionation of the operations and displacement and
diffusion of responsibility. One group manufactures
the tools of destruction. Others amass the arsenals for
legitimate sale. Others operate storage centers for
them. Others procure export and import licenses to
move the deathly wares among different countries.
Others obtain spurious end-user certificates that get
the weaponry to embargoed nations through circu-
itous routes, and still others ship the lethal wares. The
cogs in this worldwide network include weapons
manufacturers; former government officials with po-
litical ties; former diplomatic, military, and intelli-
gence officers who provide valuable diplomatic skills
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and contacts; and weapons merchants and shippers
operating legitimate businesses. By fragmenting and
dispersing subfunctions of the enterprise, the various
contributors see themselves as decent, legitimate
practitioners of their trade rather than as parties to
deathly operations.
Even producers of the television program 60 Min-
utes contributed to Terpil's coffers ("CBS Paid 2 Fu-
gitives," 1983). Terpil skipped bail to a foreign
sanctuary after he was caught selling assassination
equipment to an undercover FBI agent. He was tried
in absentia. The government attorney confronted the
lead reporter of the program about a payment of
$12,000 to an intermediary for an interview with the
fugitive Terpil. The reporter pleaded innocence
through various disengagement maneuvers.
Disengagement of moral control mechanisms has
been examined most extensively in military and polit-
ical violence. However, it is by no means confined to
extraordinary circumstances. Quite to the contrary,
such mechanisms operate in everyday situations in
which decent people routinely perform activities that
bring them profits and other benefits at injurious
costs to others. Self-exonerations are needed to neu-
tralize self-censure and to preserve self-esteem. For
example, certain industries cause harmful effects on a
large scale, either by the nature of their products or
the environmental toxification and degradation their
operations produce. Disregarding or minimizing inju-
rious consequences, or discrediting the evidence for
them, is a widely used disengagement practice. For
years, the tobacco industry, whose products kill more
than 400,000 Americans annually (McGinnis &
Foege, 1993), disputed the view that nicotine is ad-
dictive and that smoking is a major contributor to
lung cancer.
The vast supporting cast contributing to the pro-
motion of this deadly product includes talented chem-
ists discovering ammonia as a means to increase the
nicotine kick by speeding the body's absorption of
nicotine (Meier, 1998a); inventive biotech research-
ers genetically engineering a tobacco seed that dou-
bles the addictive nicotine content of tobacco plants
(Meier, 1998c); creative advertisers targeting young
age groups with merchandising and advertising
schemes depicting smoking as a sign of youthful
hipness, modernity, freedom, and women's liberation
(Dedman, 1998; Lynch & Bonnie, 1994; Meier,
1998b); ingenious officials in a subsidiary of a major
tobacco company engaging in an elaborate interna-
tional cigarette smuggling operation to evade excise
taxes (Drew, 1998); popular movie actors agreeing to
smoke in their movies for a hefty fee; legislators with
bountiful tobacco campaign contributions exempting
nicotine from drug legislation even though it is the
most addictive substance, and passing preemption
laws that block states from regulating tobacco prod-
ucts and their advertising (Lynch & Bonnie, 1994;
Public Citizen Health Research Group, 1993); U.S.
trade representatives threatening sanctions against
countries that erect barriers against the importation of
U.S. cigarettes; and even president Carter firing his
head of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare for refusing to back off on the regulation of
tobacco products.
The gun industry provides another example of
moral disengagement in the business arena. As sales
for low caliber guns stagnated, the gun industry
shifted their production to weapons of increasing
lethality (Butterfield, 1999; Diaz, 1999). The new
generation of pistols is faster firing semiautomatics
with larger magazines to hold more bullets of higher
caliber that magnify their killing power. Victims now
suffer more gunshot wounds of greater severity and
higher likelihood of death. To protect themselves
against being outgunned, the police, in turn, are
switching from revolvers to semiautomatic pistols us-
ing more lethal ammunition in the deadly escalation.
An executive of a trade group representing gun man-
ufacturers justifies the production change through ad-
vantageous comparison with normal business
practices that trivialize the lethality of the product
(Butterfield, 1999). "Just like the fashion industry,
the firearms industry likes to encourage new products
to get people to buy its products." Through social jus-
tification, he invests the more deadly weapons with
worthy self-protective purposes: "If the gun has more
stopping power, it is a more effective weapon." An-
other exonerative device absolves the gun industry of
responsibilty for the criminal use of the lethal semi-
automatic pistils they design and market:
We design weapons, not for the bad guys, but for the
good guys. If criminals happen to get their hands on a
gun, it is not the manufacturer's fault. The problem is,
you can't design a product and insure who is going to
get it.
A law suit for negligent marketing and distribution
practices won by New York City against gun manufac-
turers charged that they oversupply stores in Southern
states with lax gun laws, with knowledge that the weap-
ons are bought and resold to juveniles and criminals in
cities with tough gun laws.
Much work remains to be done in analyzing the par-
ticular forms that moral disengagement practices take
at industry-wide levels and the justificatory exonera-
tions and social arrangements that facilitate their use.
As indicated in the previous examples and other analy-
ses of industry-wide moral disengagement (Bandura,
1973), injurious corporate practices require a large net-
work ofotherwise considerate people doing jobs draw-
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ing on their expertise and social influence in the
service of a detrimental enterprise through selective
moral disengagement. Edmund Burke's aphorism that
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for
good men to do nothing" needs a companion adage that
"The triumph of evil requires a lot of good people do-
ing a bit of it in a morally disengaged way with indif-
ference to the human suffering they collectively
cause."
Institutionalized discrimination of devalued sub-
groups in societies takes a heavy toll on its victims. It
requires social justification, attributions of blame, de-
humanization, impersonalized agencies to carry out
the discriminatory practices, and inattention to the in-
jurious effects they cause. Ideologies of male domina-
tion, dehumanization, ascription of blame, and
distortion of injurious consequences also play a heavy
role in sexual abuse of women (Bandura, 1986; Burt,
1980; Sanday, 1997).
Development of Moral Disengagement
Advances in the measurement of moral disengage-
ment hold promise of furthering our understanding of
how this aspect of morality develops and influences
the courses lives take. Developmental research shows
that moral disengagement already is operating even
in the early years of life (Bandura, Barbaranelli,
Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996). It contributes to social
discordance in ways that are likely to lead down dis-
social paths. Figure 8 presents the direct and medi-
ated paths of influence of proclivity for moral
disengagement on delinquent conduct (Bandura et al.,
1996). High moral disengagers are less troubled by
anticipatory feelings of guilt over injurious conduct,
are less prosocial, and prone to ruminate about per-
.22
ceived grievances and vengeful retaliation, all of
which are conducive to aggression and antisocial
conduct. The higher the moral disengagement and the
weaker the perceived self-efficacy to resist peer pres-
sure for transgressive activities, the heavier the in-
volvement in antisocial conduct (Kwak & Bandura,
1998). Gender differences in moral disengagement do
not exist in the earlier years, but before long, boys
become more facile moral disengagers than do girls.
Moral development typically is studied in terms of
abstract principles ofmorality. Adolescents who differ
in delinquent conduct do not necessarily differ in ab-
stract moral values. Most everyone is virtuous at the
abstract level. Amorphous abstractions obscure the dy-
namic processes governing the selective disengage-
ment of moral self-sanctions. It is in the ease of moral
disengagement under the conditionals of life that the
differences lie. Among adolescents, facile moral
disengagers display higher levels of violence, theft,
and other forms of antisocial conduct than do those
who bring moral self-sanctions to bear on their conduct
(Elliott & Rhinehart, 1995). Proneness to moral disen-
gagement predicts both felony and misdemeanor as-
saults and thefts, regardless of age, sex, race, religious
affiliation, and social class. This predictive generality
attests to the pervading role of self-regulatory mecha-
nisms in detrimental conduct. Moral engagement
against destructive means can be enhanced in children
by peer modeling and the espousal of peaceable solu-
tions to human conflicts (McAlister, Ama, Barroro,
Peters, & Kelder, 1999).
Interplay of Personal and
Social Sanctions
The self-regulation of morality is not entirely an
intrapsychic matter, as rationalists might lead one to
Figure 8. Contribution of moral disengagement to the multivariate determination of delinquent behavior. All paths of influence are sig-
nificant atp < .05 or less. From "Mechanisms ofMoral Disengagement in the Exercise ofMoral Agency," by A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli,
G. V. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli, 1996,Journal ofPersonality andSocial Psychology, 71, p.370. Copyright 1996 by the American Psycho-
logical Association. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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believe. People do not operate as autonomous moral
agents impervious to the social realities in which they
are immersed. Moral agency is socially situated and
exercised in particularized ways depending on the life
conditions under which people transact their affairs.
Social cognitive theory, therefore, adopts an
interactionist perspective to morality. Moral actions
are the products of the reciprocal interplay of personal
and social influences. Conflicts arise between self
sanctions and social sanctions when individuals are so-
cially punished for courses of action they regard as
right and just. Principled dissenters and nonconform-
ists often find themselves in this predicament. Some
sacrifice their welfare for their convictions. People
also commonly experience conflicts in which they are
socially pressured to engage in conduct that violates
their moral standards. Responses to such moral dilem-
mas are determined by the relative strength of self
sanctions and social sanctions and the conditional ap-
plication of moral standards.
Sociostructural theories and psychological theories
often are regarded as rival conceptions of human be-
havior or as representing different levels of causation.
Human behavior cannot be fully understood solely in
terms of social structural factors or psychological fac-
tors. A full understanding requires an integrated per-
spective in which social influences operate through
psychological mechanisms to produce behavior ef-
fects (Bandura, 1997). Some of the moral disengage-
ment practices, such as diffusion and displacement of
responsibility, are rooted in the organizational and
authority structures of societal systems. The ideologi-
cal orientations of societies shape the form of moral
justifications, sanction detrimental practices, and in-
fluence which members of society tend to be cast into
devalued groups. These sociostructural practices cre-
ate conditions conducive to moral disengagement.
However, people are producers as well as products of
social systems. Social structures-which are devised
to organize, guide, and regulate human affairs-are
created by human activity. Moreover, within the rule
structures, there is personal variation in their interpre-
tation, adoption, enforcement, circumvention, or ac-
tive opposition (Burus & Dietz, in press).
As noted previously, social cognitive theory avoids
a dualism between social structure and personal
agency (Bandura, 1986, 1997). Sociostructural influ-
ences affect action via self-regulatory mechanisms op-
erating through a set of subfunctions. Neither
situational imperatives (Milgram, 1974) nor vile dis-
positions (Gillespie, 1971) provide a wholly adequate
explanation ofhuman malevolence. In social cognitive
theory, both sociostructural and personal determinants
operate interdependently within a unified causal struc-
ture in the perpetration ofinhumanities. Unusual forms
ofmalevolence are typically the product ofa unique in-
terplay of personal, behavioral, and environmental
influences.
Concluding Remarks
The massive threats to human welfare stem mainly
from deliberate acts ofprinciple rather than from unre-
strained acts of impulse. In the insightful words of C.
P. Snow, "More hideous crimes have been committed
in the name of obedience than in the name of rebel-
lion." Ideological resort to destructiveness is of great-
est social concern but, ironically, it is the most ignored
in psychological analyses ofpeople's inhumanities to-
ward each other. Given the many psychological de-
vices for disengaging moral control, societies cannot
rely entirely on individuals to deter human cruelty.
Civilized life requires, in addition to humane personal
codes, effective social safeguards against the misuse of
power for exploitative and destructive purposes.
Monolithic sociopolitical systems that exercise
tight control over institutional and communications
systems can wield greater power of moral disengage-
ment than can pluralistic systems that represent di-
verse perspectives, interests, and concerns. Political
diversity and institutional protection of dissent allow
challenges to suspect moral appeals. Healthy skepti-
cism toward moral pretensions puts a further check
on the misuse of morality for inhumane purposes.
Limited public access to the media has been a major
obstacle to reciprocal influence on detrimental social
policies and practices. The evolving telecommunica-
tions technologies are transforming the mode of
sociopolitical influence (Bandura, 1997). Interactive
communication through the Internet provides vast op-
portunities for participatory debates that transcend
time, place, and national boundaries about issues of
social concern. Mobilization of collective influence
against injurious social policies via the Internet can
be swift, wide-reaching, and free of monopolistic so-
cial control. But the Internet is a double-edged tool.
Internet freelancers, of course, can use this unfiltered
and unfettered political forum to mobilize support for
detrimental social practices as well as for humane
ones.
Some of the efforts at change must be directed at
institutional practices that insulate the higher eche-
lons from accountability for the detrimental policies
over which they preside. Discourses that cloak inhu-
mane activities in sanitizing language should be
stripped of their euphemistic cover. Some of the
moral disengagement is in the service of profit rather
than political purposes. Corporate practices that have
injurious human effects must be monitored, subjected
to negative sanctions, and widely publicized to enlist
the public support needed to change them. Regardless
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of whether inhumane practices are institutional, orga-
nizational, or individual, it should be made difficult
for people to remove humanity from their conduct.
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